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Australians in Crete in World War II 
Peter Monteath 
This paper argues that the Australian involvement in wartime Crete took 
place in three main phases. In the first phase Australian forces participated in 
the defence of Crete against German invasion over twelve days in May/June 
1941. The second phase began with the surrender of the Allied forces and the 
stranding on the island of perhaps a thousand Allied soldiers, including 
Australians. These men “on the run” were forced to rely on the assistance of 
Cretans for their very survival, and they found the local population 
remarkably receptive to their needs. The third and final phase grew out of the 
previous two phases and comprised Australian participation in resistance 
activities in collaboration with local resistance elements and British forces. 
The key figure in this regard was Tom Dunbabin, an Australian who became 
a senior officer with the British Special Operations Executive and who did 
much to shape the conduct of “irregular” warfare in Crete.  
Introduction
The Australian presence in Crete in the Second World War is associated 
primarily with the participation of Australian forces in the ultimately 
fruitless efforts to prevent a German invasion of the island in May 1941. 
Deployed to Crete in the wake of the failed defence of mainland Greece in 
April, the Australians and other members of Creforce (the combined Allied 
force tasked with defending Crete) were soon overrun by the German 
invasion forces. As a result, most were evacuated to Egypt at the end of May 
and the beginning of June.  
Less well known is the presence of substantial numbers of Australians in 
Crete after the main evacuations by the Royal Navy ceased. Roughly a 
thousand members of Creforce who had missed out on evacuation were able 
to evade German capture, or to escape from POW camps. These men, 
including a substantial number of Australians, were stranded on the island, 
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where they relied almost entirely on the hospitality and goodwill of Cretans, 
with whom lasting bonds of friendship were formed. The period of being 
“on the run” in Crete lasted weeks or even years, ending only with capture 
by Axis occupying forces or exfiltration from the island through British 
operations organised in Cairo. 
Even more obscure in the historical record is the contribution made by 
Australians to the Cretan resistance, which formed in the immediate wake 
of the Axis occupation. This resistance comprised the collaborative efforts of 
Cretans eager to end the occupation and British forces sent to assist the 
Cretans in that task. To a large extent, this collaboration flowed naturally 
from the combined Cretan-British efforts to evacuate the Australian and 
other British forces on the run in Crete. A key figure in these combined 
Cretan-British efforts was Thomas J. Dunbabin, an Australian archaeologist 
who became the leader of British Special Operations Executive (SOE) forces 
deployed to Crete to support and organise the resistance.  
This essay traces the course of the Australian presence in Crete in World 
War II, arguing that there were clear links in the three phases of the 
Australian presence — that is, from participation in the defence of Crete, to 
the presence of men on the run, and finally to the conduct of “special 
operations”. While the last stage is distinguished above all by the role of just 
one man in Tom Dunbabin, it was his contribution which made the most 
enduring impact on the wartime history of the island. All three stages of the 
Australian presence contributed to the foundation of close relations which 
have been maintained into the present. 
Australians in the Battle for Crete
The German invasion of Crete took place over twelve days at the end of May 
and very beginning of June 1941, and thus on the eve of a much larger 
campaign in the war, namely Operation Barbarossa, the German invasion of 
the Soviet Union. Crete was of limited strategic importance, but the boldness 
of the German military operation and the ferocity of the battle have drawn 
a good deal of attention from military historians (see especially Beevor, 1991 
and Stewart, 1991).  
The Germans conceived and executed an airborne invasion which 
commenced on 20 May and had achieved almost total mastery of the island 
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by the end of the month. Australian forces consisting of some 7,700 men 
were among the roughly 31,000 British Commonwealth men evacuated from 
mainland Greece and integrated into Creforce (Long, 1986:315–316). Placed 
under the command of the New Zealander Bernard Freyberg, the task of the 
British and Greek members of Creforce was to repel the expected German 
invasion attempt. Like the other British and Greek forces evacuated 
hurriedly from the mainland, the Australians were poorly armed and 
supplied. Moreover, the losses incurred on the mainland demanded a 
reorganisation of the available units as they joined the existing British 
garrison on Crete in preparing a defensive strategy. The largest 
concentration of Australians — four infantry battalions and a machine-gun 
battalion — was disposed to the Rethymnon sector, where the main priority 
was to defend the airfield outside the town of Rethymnon itself. During this 
crucial period of several weeks leading to the invasion, the Australian forces 
made their first acquaintances with the local population, many of whom 
would also become involved in the island’s defence (on the Australian 
contribution to the defence alongside Greek and other Allied forces see 
especially Palazzo, 2007; Long, 1986:197–319; Ewer, 2016:299–361; Hill, 
2010:195–305). 
On 20 May, two waves of German transport planes flying from mainland 
bases brought paratroops and glider-borne mountain troops to Crete, the 
dropping zones clustered around the island’s three airfields and the main 
harbour at Suda Bay. At Rethymnon, the Australians killed large numbers 
of men while still in the air and were able to contain those who landed safely, 
so that the airfield remained in Allied hands. Similarly, at Heraklion, despite 
bitter fighting, the airfield remained under Allied control. The crucial point 
at the end of the first day of fighting was the Maleme field in western Crete, 
where the airfield remained bitterly contested. 
The turning point in the Battle for Crete came in the night of 20–21 May 
with the Allied withdrawal from crucial positions adjacent to the Maleme 
airfield. Desperate efforts to retake the airfield over the following 24 hours 
proved in vain. By the end of 22 May, Crete’s fate was sealed. Although 
Australian and other British and Greek forces, often in combination with 
Cretan civilians, fought on over the following days, it was clear by 26 May 
that the island could no longer be held, and the order was issued for an 
evacuation. On that day, Freyberg cabled General Headquarters in the   
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Middle East to inform him that his forces had reached the limits of their 
endurance. It was evident that there was no alternative but to call upon the 
Royal Navy to repeat the heroics it had achieved in evacuating men from the 
mainland just a few weeks earlier (Beevor, 1991:192). 
For Australian forces, as for the other Allies and the Cretan civilians, the 
failed defence of Crete was as demoralising as the rapid defeat on the 
mainland. On this occasion, the cost for the Australians was nearly eight 
hundred casualties and over three thousand taken POW (Hill, 2010:412). 
Once more German airpower had been crucial to turning the tide of battle in 
the Germans’ favour. If there was a positive outcome, it was that the 
common participation of Australians with Cretans in the defence of the 
island, and with it the shared experience of being overwhelmed by a 
technologically superior force, created the foundation of a close relationship 
which was to offer advantages to Australians and to Cretans over the period 
of occupation.  
 
On the run 
 
The evacuations took place from two locations, namely the port at Heraklion 
on Crete’s north coast and the fishing village of Sphakia on the south coast, 
from where most of the evacuations of Australians were staged. They 
reached the village after trekking across the central spine of the island and 
then descending the steep and rocky slopes to the coast, in many cases by 
following the Imbros Gorge to the east of Sphakia. The Royal Navy exhibited 
enormous courage in committing vessels to the evacuation at a time when 
the Luftwaffe ruled the skies. Nonetheless, from 1 June it was no longer 
possible to perform evacuations. By that time about half of the British forces 
had been evacuated — that is, some 16,500 men. Others, however, who in 
many cases had been guided to the areas adjacent to Sphakia in anticipation 
of evacuation, were left behind. Stuck in a hopeless situation between 
mountains and sea, the officer appointed to command the stranded men was 
entrusted with the task of surrendering to the Germans (Beevor, 1991:224).  
The other significant group stranded was the Australian force which had 
successfully defended the airfield at Rethymnon but become isolated from 
the rest of Creforce and unaware of the order to evacuate. These men were 
trapped near Rethymnon when German forces pushed rapidly eastward   
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from the Canea sector. In these circumstances the Australian commanding 
officers reacted in different ways. The career officer Ian Campbell, who 
commanded 2/1st Battalion, performed a textbook surrender of his unit to the 
Germans, so that all of his men entered captivity on 29 May (Ewer, 2016:355). 
In contrast, the militia officer in charge of the 2/11th Battalion, the Western 
Australian Ray Sandover, gave his men the option of heading south into the 
hills of central Crete with the hope that at some point they might be able to 
find some means of departing the island from the south coast (Monteath, 
2017:59–60). 
The number of men who were “on the run” is impossible to know exactly 
but has been estimated at around one thousand, among whom several 
hundred were Australians.1 They were evaders, who managed to avoid 
capture for varying lengths of time until they were either captured or they 
managed to find some means of escape by sea. Over time there were also 
escapers, that is, men who had been taken into captivity and held in one of 
the POW facilities established by the Germans in the vicinity of Canea. As 
these camps were makeshift affairs, typically consisting of not much more 
than a barbed-wire enclosure, escape from them was relatively simple. If 
they achieved that, the aims of the escapers were identical with those of the 
evaders, that is, to hide out on the island until an opportunity to depart 
presented itself.  
The willingness of Australian and other soldiers to evade or escape was 
conditioned in part by the fear of captivity, a prospect which very few had 
hitherto contemplated. A further factor was also the perception that they 
were likely to be well-treated by Cretan civilians, who themselves would be 
opposed to the regime of occupation being established by the Germans over 
most of the island and by Italians in the Lasithi province in the east. That 
perception was based, in part, on the relations established between Cretan 
civilians and Allied forces in the weeks leading to the German invasion. 
Overwhelmingly, it appears that the experiences of evaders and escapers 
proved that perception accurate. First-hand accounts by Australians and 
other men on the run confirm the extraordinary level of hospitality accorded   
                                                          
1 Damer and Frazer (2007:264–269) identify 213 Australians who were successfully evacuated 
from Crete. Beyond that figure is an unknown number of men who were not evacuated but 
eventually captured or recaptured by Axis forces, commonly after lengthy periods on the 
run. 
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them by locals, who provided them with food and shelter at great risk to 
themselves. From the very earliest days of the German occupation it was 
apparent that any act of resistance, including the harbouring of men on the 
run, would be treated with extraordinary harshness, extending to the loss of 
life and the razing of entire villages (on the brutality of the German 
occupation regime in Crete see especially Xylander, 1989).  
The Cretan hospitality toward the men on the run was an extension of the 
long-established principle of philoxenia. It was also an acknowledgment that 
the men had made a sincere effort to prevent the German occupation. 
Cretans were imbued with an historical sense which foregrounded the 
experience of occupation dating back centuries; for many the Turkish 
occupation was a matter of living memory. Empathy and hospitality in the 
face of acute dangers were a manifestation of a sense of gratitude toward 
those who had collaborated in efforts to prevent a renewed invasion and 
occupation. The extent to which Cretan philoxenia translated to practical 
assistance for Australians and others is evident in countless testimonies from 
soldiers who were given refuge by Cretans. This occurred typically within 
villages or at hidden locations nearby, so that the men could be plied with 
food and drink, even in circumstances where the Cretans themselves were 
enduring wartime privations. One of the Australians on the run, for 
example, recalled: 
As long as the Cretans had anything they would give it to us. When we went 
hungry we knew that they were going hungry too. Even when they had no 
food to offer someone always invited us in for a glass of wine or ouzo. They 
would share their last piece of bread with us and we would all sit around the 
table dipping the hard crust into a cup of olive oil and vinegar, and if we were 
lucky, crunching away on a piece of raw onion. Sometimes the host, with vast 
ceremony after the repast, would bring out his only cigarette and, solemnly 
cutting it into three, would pass the pieces around with the air of an 
ambassador handing out cigars after a banquet. (Peck, n.d.:49) 
Among hundreds of examples of such selfless generosity toward the 
Australians, two examples stand out. One is that of Reg Saunders, who was 
among those members of 2/7 Battalion who made their way eastward from 
Sphakia after they were stranded there (Gilchrist, 2007:74–76). As an 
Indigenous man Saunders stood a high chance of being recognised as a 
soldier on the run, yet he was shown hospitality for a period of almost a year 
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until he was finally evacuated from the island on 22 May 1942 (Damer & 
Frazer, 2007:260). A fellow Australian who encountered him on Crete not 
long before his evacuation noted with surprise the presence on the island of 
“a nearly black Australian, a cheerful man who was an object of wonder to 
the natives” (Dunbabin, 2015a:26). 
The other remarkable case is that of Norman Scott of 2/8 Battalion, who 
led a troglodyte existence in a cave south of Suda Bay, having escaped 
German captivity, and who relied on the assistance and discretion of locals. 
One woman from the nearby village of Neo Horio, Irini Lagonikakis, 
trekked regularly to his cave to tend to his needs. In time, however, a diet 
consisting in large part of grass and snails caused Scott’s health to 
deteriorate to the extent that he became completely paralysed over a period 
of several months, so that his very survival was dependent on Lagonikakis. 
Ultimately his lack of mobility impeded his chance of evacuation, and he fell 
into German hands in April 1944, having spent 34 months in his cave (Damer 
& Frazer, 2007:133, 172–173, 197). 
It was well known among British authorities in Cairo that the evacuations 
staged by the Royal Navy had not collected all men, that most of the 
remainder had been captured by Germans, and that an unknown number 
were “on the run”. It was recognised that efforts had to be made to remove 
them, though this presented a significant logistical challenge. The British 
organisation tasked with aiding POWs, escapers and evaders was MI9, 
which had a small presence in Cairo. There it collaborated with another 
organisation, the Special Operations Executive (SOE), to find ways to extract 
men on the run, often referred to as “stragglers”. In part, the mounting sense 
of urgency in rescuing the men was motivated by the realisation that the 
presence of significant numbers of them was putting great strain on the local 
population, whose lives and livelihoods were at risk. A British report 
warned, “These [men on the run] are a severe liability to the Cretans and a 
source of insecurity to our organisation. If we fail to evacuate them, the 
Cretans will lose some of the confidence they have in our ability to help them 
against the Axis” (“Appreciation”, 1942:4). 
While formal responsibility rested with MI9, most of the early activity 
undertaken from Cairo to gather together and evacuate the “stragglers” was 
undertaken by officers of the Special Operations Executive. This was a 
clandestine organisation founded by Churchill in mid-1940 to resist Axis 
occupation regimes, primarily through sabotage and the encouragement of 
local resistance. The first SOE representative sent to Crete to facilitate 
evacuations was Francis Pool, who landed by submarine at Preveli on   
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Crete’s central south coast on 26 July 1941 and performed an evacuation of 
over two hundred men on 22 August 1941 (“Final Report”, 1945:32).  
After the Pool visit, it was confirmed in Cairo that SOE would take over 
the organisation of all MI9 activity in Crete.2 As further SOE officers were 
infiltrated into Crete, they understood the rounding up and evacuation of 
“stragglers” to be one of their tasks. To perform it, they relied on the 
cooperation of the men still stranded there, but they also drew on the help 
of men who reached safety in Cairo and yet were prepared to be infiltrated 
back into enemy territory with the aim of carrying out this task. Similar 
arrangements were made for mainland Greece, where it was known that 
men on the run still hoped to find their way to their units, whether by 
crossing the Aegean or taking a circuitous land route via neutral Turkey.  
A number of Australians were among those men who, having reached 
Egypt, agreed to be reinfiltrated to mainland Greece or Crete to aid their 
countrymen on the run. A report lists two Australian soldiers employed to 
carry out escape work: William Maynard Bazely and Francis Neil Tudor 
Brewer (“Summary”, 1945). Records show that both were POWs, and then 
both were employed on “intelligence duties” from November 1941.3 What 
exactly they were asked to do was shrouded in some mystery, though a 
confidential report divulged that they “had made outstanding escapes, and 
had volunteered to go back to carry on escape work to rescue those left 
behind” (“Summary”, 1945).  
There was also an officer, Lieutenant G.J. Greenway of the Western 
Australian 2/11 Battalion who, after finally departing Crete by submarine in 
late August 1941, did not hesitate to volunteer for special duties despite the 
extreme hardships he had just endured. He was sent to Greece, where he 
helped establish an evacuation line through the Greek islands to neutral   
                                                          
2 This was determined in a discussion in Cairo of the extraction of “stragglers” in Crete and is 
recorded in the document, “Minutes of a meeting on 6 Nov. 1941, to discuss operation in 
Crete”, The National Archives (TNA) HS 5/678.  
3 The records of Bazely and Brewer are held in the National Archives of Australia: NAA: AWM 
63 175/500/45, Escaped Prisoner of War VX 12521 Private VM Bazely, 2/5 Australian 
Infantry Battalion and NX 3461 Gunner J. Brewer, 2/1 Australian Field Regiment — 
employed on intelligence duties, Advanced HQ “A” Force, Cairo. See also the Australian 
War Memorial record AWM76 B37, Official Historian 1939-1945 War, biographical files — 
F.W. Baylos, H.E. Bayliss, A.M. Bayne, A.W. Bazely, W.S. Beadman, L.E. Beale and R. Beale 
and AWM63 122/500/15 VX12521 Pte [Private] W.M. Bazely — 2/5 Aust Inf Bn [Australian 
Infantry Battalion] — [Attachment for special duty]. 
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Turkey, a feat which earned him — on the recommendation of MI9 — a 
Military Cross (Gilchrist, 2007:77).4  
The logistical difficulties associated with sending vessels from Egypt or 
Libya to Crete, the vagaries of the weather and the dangers of performing 
evacuations under the noses of the Germans, meant that they were not 
always successful and sometimes ended in bitter disappointment. Such was 
the case on one occasion at the tiny southern coastal village of Treis Ekklesies 
(Three Churches), where a British SOE officer, Xan Fielding, came across an 
encampment of men — mainly Australians and New Zealanders — dealing 
with the disappointment of their thwarted departure: 
 
The chorus of Waltzing Matilda filled the dusk as loudly as a wireless 
switched on at full blast against a background of yowling, spluttering 
atmospherics composed of typically Antipodean sounds of revelry; and 
through the open door of the village coffee-shop I saw a horde of frenzied 
giants in tattered khaki and slouch hats. All these men had hoped to be 
evacuated from Three Churches two days before and were now, 
understandably enough, drowning their disappointment — an easy feat in 
Crete, where wine and raki were both more plentiful than food. (Fielding, 
1954:43) 
 
Special Operations 
 
SOE’s role in Crete is known above all for the daring kidnapping of a 
German general in April 1944. Led by two British officers — Patrick Leigh 
Fermor and Billy Moss — and with the participation of a number of Cretans, 
the abduction has been depicted in film and literature. In reality, however, 
the tasks performed by SOE in Crete were wide-ranging, and they involved 
a number of Australians. One of them, Tom Dunbabin, though not well 
known in his native Australia and barely mentioned in histories of SOE, 
arguably played the most crucial role for SOE in Crete. 
As indicated above, an important component of SOE’s work in the 
aftermath of the Axis occupation of Crete was the evacuation of men on the   
                                                          
4 NAA: B883 WX976 Greenway, George James. According to Hugh Gilchrist, as part of his 
rescue operations Greenway made at least one visit to Crete, where along with Bazely and 
Brewer he evacuated Abbot Lagouvardas of the Preveli monastery on Crete’s central coast, 
which had sheltered large numbers of men on the run (Gilchrist, 2007:77). 
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run. Although this was nominally the work of MI9, in the early phase the 
task was delegated to SOE officers who were infiltrated to the island, sought 
to round up “stragglers”, and guided them to evacuation points. In 
performing that task, the SOE officers came into contact with Cretans who 
were willing not only to assist evacuations but also to undertake other 
activities which undermined the German occupation. As the number of 
stragglers declined, the emphasis of SOE officers shifted more and more to 
its core tasks of sabotage and subversion. 
Just as a small number of Australians who had managed to be evacuated 
from Crete agreed to be reinfiltrated to assist men on the run in mainland 
Greece and Crete, so there were some Australians who lent assistance to SOE 
officers on the island. The best known of those SOE officers, Patrick Leigh 
Fermor, wrote in one of his reports of the assistance given to him by an 
Australian soldier by the name of Bill Ledgerwood. As he prepared to 
arrange Ledgerwood’s evacuation in May 1943, Leigh Fermor wrote: 
 
I am evacuating Sergeant Bill Ledgerwood, A.I.F., with the May trip and you 
may find him useful. He is an excellent chap who was left behind after the fall 
of Crete, since when he has been to no less than 10 real and rumoured 
evacuation beaches, ranging from Kissamo to Ierapetra. He can rub along in 
Greek, and gets on well with Cretans, who think very highly of him. He 
knows certain parts of Crete well, especially Rethymnon Nomos, Apokoronas 
and Sphakia. There is scarcely a village in the first two where he has not got 
contacts. D’Annunzio [Vlepakes] of Headland [Kephala]5 used him as a 
messenger for carrying money in D’As philanthropic organisation. He has 
been on my staff since Tom’s departure,6 and has been most useful running 
my camp, such as it is. I recommend him to your attention for us in later raids 
etc. in Crete. (Leigh Fermor, 1943:33) 
 
Later that year Leigh Fermor included in the material he sent to Cairo a 
brief report by another Australian, N. T. Dudley, who wrote of being a 
member of the Bandouvas resistance group, which numbered some eighty 
but had the capacity if required to call on another two thousand (Dudley, 
1943). After the war, Dudley’s widow wrote of her husband, “After the 
capitulation of Greece he managed to get to Crete, was captured but escaped   
                                                          
5 For security reasons SOE officers commonly used code-names for people and places. 
6 ‘Tom’ here is Tom Dunbabin, an Australian SOE officer discussed below. 
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and masqueraded as a Greek after being taught enough of the language to 
get by. He formed the guerrilla warfare in the hills, was on Crete for two and 
a half years in which time I heard nothing”.7 
SOE’s Xan Fielding also received invaluable assistance from Australians 
in 1943. In the first part of the year MI9 had an agent on the island, the New 
Zealander Tom Moir, rounding up “stragglers”. However, Moir was 
captured by Germans, with the result that the evacuation being organised 
by Moir had to be completed by Fielding, who drew on the help of a number 
of men (Damer & Frazer, 2007:261). A British report noted that great credit 
for that evacuation was “due to certain of the British and Imperial strays 
who carried his [i.e. Fielding’s] plans to a successful conclusion and 
particularly to [the Australian] NX.5452 Pte. Charles Hunter who assumed 
full responsibility until XAN’s arrival the day before the evacuation”.8 
The “Official Report” on SOE’s activities in Crete indicates that when Xan 
Fielding was first infiltrated into Crete in January 1942 aboard the vessel 
Hedgehog, he was accompanied by a party whose task it was to carry out 
sabotage on shipping in the island’s main port, Suda Bay. Listed among the 
members of the party is a Sergeant G. Delaney of the AIF (“Final Report”, 
1945:36). The same report listed a number of other Australians who offered 
to be sent to Crete to carry out duties there. One was John Simcoe, “a brilliant 
diver and underwater swimmer”, who had helped SOE recover stores lost 
during a “crash landing” the previous November and had rounded up a 
“batch of strays” to deliver to the evacuation point. Similarly, the Australian 
Charles Ezzy had carried stores for SOE and had also helped Hunter with 
the successful May 1943 evacuation, while the Victorian Joseph Bertie was 
praised for the helpful knowledge he provided of the Selino district.9 
 
Tom Dunbabin 
 
The most influential of the Australians who served for or with SOE in Crete 
was Tom Dunbabin; indeed, there is a strong case that Dunbabin was the   
                                                          
7 This is from a letter by Mercia Dudley to Central Army Records, dated 3 October 1980, and is 
held in Dudley’s service records, NAA: B883, NX5173. 
8 The report by the British officer Captain Arthur Reade is held in the SOE file, TNA HS 5/730. 
9 This information is contained in an undated SOE report by Leslie Stevenson, TNA HS 5/730. 
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most effective of all the SOE officers, even if he is not as well remembered as 
others. 
Unlike the men mentioned above, Dunbabin played no role in the Battle 
for Crete, and yet he had a longstanding relationship with the island and 
with Greek culture. Born in rural Tasmania in 1911, he received much of his 
education in Melbourne, Sydney and then Corpus Christi College Oxford. 
During his studies in Europe and then in the course of his work as an 
archaeologist, be became familiar with many parts of the Mediterranean, 
including Crete (for biographical information on Dunbabin see especially 
Dunbabin, 2015b; Gilchrist, 2007:88–93; Powell, 1986:104–105, 161–168).  
On the outbreak of war in September 1939, Dunbabin was employed at 
the British Legation in Athens. In January 1940 he enlisted with the Oxford 
and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry before transferring to the War Office in 
London as an intelligence officer (Powell, 1973:161). In September 1941 he 
joined SOE, and after his arrival in Egypt in December he received specialist 
training for deployment to Crete (Dunbabin, 2015b:103). By this time he was 
31 years of age, married, and with a young family.  
Dunbabin’s first mission to Crete commenced in April 1942 and lasted 
until 15 February 1943, when he was exfiltrated to Cairo — and awarded a 
DSO. The second tour of duty lasted from 7 September 1943 to 24 May 1944 
and the third from 13 July to December 1944. His record shows that he was 
re-infiltrated one last time on 4 February 1945, before being sent to Cairo for 
debriefing on 6 April 1945. Like other SOE officers, Dunbabin was required 
to submit reports of his work to SOE’s Cairo office, and these remain an 
invaluable source for an understanding of his activities in Crete.10 
Furthermore, at the end of the war Dunbabin was required to submit a final 
report on SOE activities in Crete, and this too gives a detailed and at times 
critical assessment of British clandestine warfare (“Final Report”).11 After the 
war, Dunbabin began working on a longer manuscript recording his 
impression of his service in Crete, but because of his premature death in 1955 
he completed less than half of it. Nonetheless, it is a document which recalls 
frankly both the challenges and the rewards of working with Cretans during 
the harsh German occupation (Dunbabin, 2015a).  
                                                          
10 Dunbabin’s SOE reports are held in TNA HS5/723 and HS5/724. 
11 Neither in the original report as it was written in 1945, nor in its published form, as edited by 
N.A. Kokonas in 2004, is Dunbabin identified as the author, but his authorship is evident 
from its presence in Dunbabin’s SOE file TNA HS5/724.  
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What is striking in these sources written by Dunbabin himself, but also 
from the recollections of Cretans and others who knew him, is his capacity 
to adapt to the harsh circumstances which prevailed in wartime Crete. 
Dunbabin recalled after the war that he arrived on the island “lamentably 
ill-fitted for life in the Cretan hills. My dress suggested a dock-labourer, 
rather than a hillsman” (Dunbabin, 2015a:34). He was provided with a new 
pair of boots — crucial on the unrelentingly rocky terrain — a tailored pair 
of Cretan breeches, an identity as a native of the village of Agios Ioannis in 
the Amari Valley, and then he grew a moustache, considered indispensable 
to pass unnoticed (Dunbabin, 2015a:34). Dunbabin’s fellow SOE officer 
Sandy Rendel recalled Dunbabin’s appearance when the two met in the 
Amari Valley in central Crete: 
 
There I found Tom dressed in a large shepherd cloak, longer and blacker than 
the usual. From behind he looked like a caricature of a Grand Inquisitor, and 
from the front the twirly black moustache which had made such an 
unfortunate addition to his uniform in Cairo, looked curiously at home under 
his shepherd’s cowl. (Rendel, 1953:102) 
 
When Dunbabin first arrived in Crete, most of the evacuations of 
“stragglers” had already occurred, so that this constituted a small part of his 
brief. Increasingly, his attention was devoted to gathering intelligence about 
the Axis presence on the island and to building a coherent resistance 
movement. The latter in particular was no easy task, because at that time the 
Cretan resistance was both fragmented and suffering under a very severe 
occupation regime.  
A decisive test of Dunbabin’s political and diplomatic skills came in the 
form of an encounter with the well-known resistance figure — andarte — 
Manolis Bandouvas. Bandouvas was a highly regarded figure with a strong 
personal following in central Crete. One of the SOE officers, Xan Fielding, 
described him as “a dark burly man with sad ox-eyes and a correspondingly 
deep-throated voice in which he was fond of uttering cataclysmic aphorisms 
such as ‘The struggle needs blood, my lads’”(Fielding, 1954:194). While both 
Fielding and Dunbabin appreciated Bandouvas’ courage and commitment 
to the resistance cause, they also recognised that Bandouvas’ impetuosity 
risked the kind of open military confrontation with German forces that could 
only end badly for the poorly-armed Cretans. This was the danger which 
presented itself with the parachuted delivery of British weapons and   
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ammunition in October 1942. A confrontation developed between Dunbabin 
and Bandouvas, with the former insisting that the supplies were for SOE’s 
use, while Bandouvas took the view that he and his men should be the 
beneficiaries. George Psychoundakis, the “Cretan Runner” who aided SOE 
operations, recounted that Bandouvas “retreated before Mr. Tom’s 
determination” (Psychoundakis, 1954:89).12 Another Cretan, Georgios 
Tzitzikas, recalled the timely intervention of another andarte, 
Petrakogeorgis, in the resolution of the dispute: 
 
The supplies were dropped by an English plane and Bandouvas immediately 
said that he would take the lot, because he was the leader, and he would share 
it out among his andartes. But Tom told him that the things belong to the 
English service and that he would give them out as he liked. Bandouvas 
threatened to kill the Englishman. Petrakogeorgis intervened and told him, 
‘In God’s name, godbrother! Are we to cut our own throats, instead of joining 
in the common cause?’ 
 
Of course other people intervened too, including Kostis Paradisanos, and 
Bandouvas was forced to back down and that was when they split up. 
Petrakogiorgis and Bandouvas split up and never joined forces again. 
(Tzitzikas, 2012:60–61) 
 
With his authority and respect established, Dunbabin went on to building 
links among various resistance figures and political organisations, and in 
particular between the conservative Ethnike Organosis Kretes (National 
Organisation of Crete, EOK) — which he helped to found — and the more 
progressive Ethnikon Apeleftherotikon Metopon (National Liberation Front, 
EAM), which also contained a number of communist elements. So high was 
the regard with which he was held by the Cretans and by SOE in Cairo, that 
from September 1944 Dunbabin became the overall field commander of SOE 
in Crete. In that capacity he applied his skills to ensuring a peaceful 
transition to a post-war order, as the German presence retreated to the area 
in and around Canea. Unlike the mainland, Crete indeed managed a post-
war transition free of bloodshed.  
                                                          
12 The Cretan George Psychoundakis rendered invaluable assistance to “stragglers” and to SOE 
officers, above all by running messages from one district to another, and recorded his 
recollections of his role in his popular book The Cretan Runner, translated into English by 
Patrick Leigh Fermor. 
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Many were fulsome in their praise of Dunbabin and his role in bringing 
about that outcome, not least his fellow SOE officers. Patrick Leigh Fermor, 
for example, said of him that his “judgement of men was deep and sound, 
with the single exception that he always placed himself humbly in the 
background” (Leigh Fermor, 2015:135). Billy Moss, who participated in the 
successful SOE abduction of General Kreipe, claimed, “It was mostly thanks 
to Tom’s wisdom and far-sightedness in helping to found the E.O.K. 
Resistance organisation that Crete was spared the hostilities and post-war 
strife in mainland Greece” (Moss, 1950:210). In a similar vein SOE’s Sandy 
Rendel, who had known Dunbabin at Oxford before the war, reminisced: 
 
Tom Dunbabin had so many qualities … that he really was an awfully good 
choice as our main man. He had a very good background knowledge and you 
wouldn’t have believed it, but the time he had been all over Crete, how many 
thousands of Cretans loved the man and very greatly respected him, 
including some of the toughest characters you could ever meet. (Rendel et al., 
1991:50)  
 
Meeting with fellow SOE veterans long after the war, Rendel offered the 
opinion, “with all respect to everybody and I’m sure you’ll agree, he was 
streets better than any of us” (Rendel et al., 1991:49).  
Cretan opinion was equally generous. When an SOE officer toured 
through Crete in the company of Dunbabin in the final part of the war, he 
observed: 
 
He is known as Mr ‘Tom’ from one end of the Island to the other, even in parts 
which he has never visited. During our tour with the Brigadier13 in December 
we passed through villages some that were new to him, but the welcome was 
always the same. I feel he might well be called the Pimpernel of Crete 
although I know he would hate such a suggestion. (Oxland, 1945:25) 
 
The most widely known of the Cretan helpers to the SOE missions, 
George Psychoundakis, recalled a high-spirited encounter in the Amari 
Valley which displays as much as any other episode the extent to which 
Dunbabin was able to establish a rapport with Cretans from many 
backgrounds. Psychoundakis had guided a resistance figure to the Amari   
                                                          
13 Brigadier Barker-Benfield, Head of SOE in Cairo. 
 158 
PETER MONTEATH 
 
for discussions with Dunbabin, who at that time had a lair near Khardaki on 
the slopes of Mt Kedros: 
 
He had a fine hut there with a sheet of corrugated iron on the roof, probably 
used by the shepherds who pastured their flocks there in winter-time. When 
they had had their talk, we all sat down and began singing. Mr. Tom’s 
hideout, unlike ours, was very handy for food and drink, and the wine in 
those parts is like the wine at the marriage of Cana in Galilee. Also, they had 
such a large supply of oranges that some of them had gone bad. Everyone 
began to drink deeply, and by and by, we were all very merry and this soon 
turned into a rag. We started with the oranges, picking out the rotten ones 
and throwing them at each other. Mr. Pavlo [i.e. Pavlos Vernadakis] didn’t 
like this at all, and said it wasn’t right. But before he could finish, he caught 
several on the head at the same moment, the attack being led by Mr. Tom. 
When the oranges were finished, it was the turn of sticks and stones. Mr. Tom 
had got hold of a long stick, with which he charged down on the others 
pretending it was a rifle with a fixed bayonet. I had never seen him in such 
high spirits before. Then it was the turn for water — whole bucketfuls were 
thrown about, until we were all drenched to the skin. There was shouting and 
horseplay until nightfall. (Psychoundakis, 1954:210) 
 
Cretans’ fondness of Dunbabin continued beyond the war, so that a 
popular song, simply titled “Tom”, was sung by Cretans for many years, 
and he was made an honorary citizen of Heraklion (Gilchrist, 2007:91). It was 
there that a memorial service was held soon after his tragic death in 1955, 
and his old friend Patrick Leigh Fermor delivered a eulogy which heaped 
praise on his former comrade-in-arms: 
 
During all those years he shared all the hardships and ordeals of guerrilla life 
with the Cretans: the snow and the cold, the hunger and the thirst, the 
sleeping on branches and stones, the exhaustion and the ever-present danger. 
And he shared, too, the rewards of that life: the company of men whom he 
loved and respected and who loved and respected him. Kind and just to all, 
he was stern and merciless to himself; he never shrank from a task, however 
hard a battle it was, mental or physical. On those endless marches through 
the mountains from cave to cave, or in flight from the German raids, he would 
carry the same load on his back as the hardiest mountaineer bred among the 
goat-rocks. (Leigh Fermor, 2015:133) 
  
 159 
AUSTRALIANS IN CRETE IN WORLD WAR II 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
The three stages of the Australian presence in Crete during World War II 
proceeded almost seamlessly one from the other. Though Australians 
generally fought well in the Battle of Crete, errors in the preparation of the 
island’s defence, followed by tactical flaws from the beginning of the 
campaign, brought a rapid defeat, a failure to evacuate large numbers of 
men, and the commencement of a new phase of the Australian presence on 
the island. Though their contact with the local population before the German 
invasion had been brief, those Australians stranded on Crete encountered a 
remarkable willingness among locals to feed and accommodate them. The 
third and final phase of the Australian presence in Crete began when the 
efforts to evacuate “stragglers” evolved into a series of activities organised 
by SOE in support of Cretan resistance. The Australian participation in 
SOE’s work was remarkable for the willingness of evacuees to return to the 
island in support of those stranded there. Most remarkable, however, is the 
major role of Tom Dunbabin, who displayed exceptional political and 
diplomatic talent in bringing together diverse resistance elements and made 
a vital contribution to the peaceful transition to a post-war order.  
Through those three phases the Australians exhibited a level of 
adaptability which facilitated their survival. Confronted with harsh and 
unfamiliar circumstances, they were able to pursue a number of survival 
strategies which protected them from the challenges posed by both the 
natural environment and a vindictive Axis occupation regime. This 
adaptability is best exemplified by Tom Dunbabin. Though a man of great 
sophistication and erudition, he accepted the rigours of wartime life in rural 
Crete; perhaps his own early life in rural Tasmania had equipped him with 
the ability to return to the rhythms of the most rudimentary country life.  
For their part, the Cretans who looked after the Australians developed an 
extraordinary level of empathy with them. From the beginning they 
understood that the Australians and the other Allied forces were there not 
to occupy Crete but to defend it against an imminent threat. Their treatment 
of the Australians was on the one hand an extension of the longstanding 
tradition of philoxenia, but it was also a recognition of a unity of purpose in 
the face of a common enemy.    
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